my visions of broadly democratic Confucian political philosophy overlap and, I think, reinforce one another. Still, there are places where we see things differently, and so dialogue like the present exchange -and the prior workshop on my book that Joseph generously arranged at his university in April 2013 -are crucial to furthering the constructive development of progressive versions of Confucianism.
I am pleased that Joseph has focused on the self-restriction idea, which is indeed central to my book. By pointing out the structurally similar arguments made by rule utilitarians and by J. S. Mill, Joseph helps to demystify the idea of self-restriction. Even if the strongest proponents of Mou Zongsan's full metaphysical theory might blanch at the ways in which we are applying this thinned-down version of selfrestriction to various contexts, I believe it is a healthy kind of cross-cultural philosophical stimulation. In a forthcoming article, in fact, I argue that the virtue politics of Aristotle and Hume could each be strengthened by embracing forms of selfrestriction. 1 At its core, Joseph's critique is that the self-restriction-based arguments that I use to defend "progressive Confucianism" are insecure foundations for democracy. As he argues in detail in his new book, he believes that we find a satisfactory basis for Confucian democracy in two different forms of justification -an instrumental argument in terms of sanctions and an expressive argument in terms of trust. My goal here is to clarify the relation between self-restriction, sages, and politics; to argue on this basis that self-restriction may be a more powerful argument than Joseph has described; and to suggest that Confucians may in fact need something with the ambition of my self-restriction argument if we are to justify a political arrangement as adequate to the central goals of Confucianism.
Joseph says that the distinctive ambition of my book rests in part on my "taking seriously the existence of sages." Several of his arguments aim to show that the weaknesses or limited applicability of self-restriction-based arguments emerge from my commitment to sages. For example, what he calls the "sagehood argument" maintains that political democracy is necessary because it enables the full achievement of sagehood -which relies on the actual exercise of considerable political power -for anyone. To this, Joseph responds that sagehood is extremely rare at best, and high office is not equally possible for all. Confucians would do better with a "ren argument," according to which all we must aim at is the less demanding personal ideal of ren (humaneness). A second place in which my (putative) reliance on actual sages figures in Joseph's arguments comes when he asks us to consider what political arrangement would make sense in a society with "just one or a few sages who are recognized and endorsed by a majority of subjects with limited moral capacity." Based on my premises, he says, dictatorship should actually be preferred to democracy under these circumstances. For reasons like this, my self-restriction arguments are weak, and we should look elsewhere for better justifications of democracy.
Joseph is correct that I repeatedly insist that we Confucians should hold that the achievement of sagehood is, in principle, possible. However, both in the book under review and in Sagehood, I emphasize that Confucians view virtue as a continuum. The practical human task is to become more like a sage, not actually to become a sage. In this, Mou Zongsan agrees with me. As I say on page 49 of Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy: "Despite the fact that sagehood is accessible in principle, there are few if any actual sages, and certainly none that can be confidently identified at any particular point in time. As Mou Zongsan puts it, achieving sagehood is an 'endless process.'" This orientation toward sagehood informs the whole book, from my endorsement of Zhang Shizhao's statement, "the absolute authority of virtue, no one but sages can attain, . . . [but] there never has been this kind of sage" (p. 63), to my claim that deference is valuable in part because it "expresses a recognition of one's finite and fallible nature" (p. 130). So the idea that someone might be appropriately "recognized and endorsed" as a sage is not something that I can accept. Plenty of emperors claimed to be sages, but their ability to do so with comparative impunity rests precisely on the problematic political institutions that selfrestriction critiques.
So my argument is not that we must take actual sages into account, but rather that Confucian political philosophy must be based on the promotion of ethical progress, up to and including the limit case of the sage. Among other things, this means that individuals must be enabled to participate in their societies, because such an "outer" practice of virtues is essential to their nature of virtues. Virtues are not merely "inner," nor is humaneness (ren) merely a personal ideal. In the limit case of the full attainment of ren, Confucius says, "the world will turn to ren along with him" (Analects 12 : 1). Now I find Joseph's arguments that social participation is often more accessible and more valuable than political participation to be convincing. However, only with a suitable system of laws and rights, suitably observed and enforced, will all these forms of participation be possible. In addition, as I argue in the book, to allow some levels of participation but to close off top political posts is to deny citizens opportunities that may be key to full moral maturity (see p. 115). I suspect it may also be possible borrow some of the apparatus from Joseph's new book and argue that denying citizens access to top leadership roles is also expressively bad.
In short, once we recognize the dependence of multiple kinds of participation on laws and rights, and acknowledge the importance of engaging in multifaceted participation in order to develop toward sagehood, the necessity of self-restriction for moral progress becomes clearer. I am happy to agree with Joseph that there are other Confucian, or Confucian-compatible, justifications that support constitutional democracy; I have learned much from his recent book on this score. I do worry, though, that the justifications he provides may undergird a form of perfectionism that is weaker than Confucians should desire. Joseph tends to put the goals of Confucian politics in terms of the promotion of the people's well-being or good life. These categories are potentially quite open-ended, so perhaps they can include the moral development that I find to be so central to Confucianism. But this is not terribly clear, and I think Joseph would agree that his instrumental and expressive justifications for democracy are, at the very least, less directly connected to individual progress toward sagehood than is the self-restriction argument. So perhaps there is a role for all three kinds of arguments, as we seek to develop contemporary Confucianism in fruitful ways. Reply to Stephen C. Angle
Joseph Chan
I am grateful to the editors of this journal for the opportunity to respond to Stephen Angle's thoughtful reply to my review of his book. Stephen and I share a "progressive" vision of Confucian political philosophy, and I think his book represents an important attempt to provide a foundation that forges a close connection with the ethical core of Confucianism. What I found most intriguing and provocative in Stephen's book is not only his general claim that Confucian moral progress requires constitutional democracy, but, more importantly, his specific "self-restriction" argument that even sages, if they exist, have to restrict their virtue and submit themselves to the laws of a constitutional democracy, so as to allow their own and other people's virtue to flourish. In my opinion, this argument, if sound, provides the strongest Confucian-based argument for democracy, and this is the target of my critique. I argue that in the (unlikely) event that sages do exist, Confucians should favor benevolent guardianship rather than democracy; that is, sages should not restrict their perfect virtue but make full use of it in their service to the people -in which case the selfrestriction argument does not work. In his reply to my review, Stephen clarifies that the argument in his book "is not that we must take actual sages into account." He agrees with Zhang Shizhao that "there never has been this kind of sage [with absolute authority of virtue]" or at least "none that can be confidently identified at any particular point in time" (bracketed words added). This suggests that his self-restriction argument for constitutional democracy is not based on a "commitment to sages" and that my critique is based on an inadequate understanding of that argument.
Admittedly, Stephen does not claim that sages have actually existed. Nevertheless, for me, the most important and interesting part of the book lies in its attempt to explore the implication of the limit case of the sage -the theoretical possibility of the existence of the sage -for Confucian politics. In his response, Stephen also says that his argument is that "Confucian political philosophy must be based on the promotion of ethical progress, up to and including the limit case of the sage" (italics added).
The limit case of the sage appears to be a central concern throughout the book. On page 28, for example, Stephen approvingly quotes Mou: "No matter how great or spiritual the attainment of one's [virtuous] character, when manifested in politics, one cannot override the relevant limits (that is, the highest principle of the political world)." Later, he writes: "one way of summarizing 'self-restriction,' as it applies in the political realm, is that even sages cannot violate the constitution" (p. 66). On
